Their incorporation went through many changes, a lot for a company which is not even trading yet, not to mention the fact that their website has a Columbian domain.

First, in 2017, the company was incorporated in Deleware in the USA. Then, in the same year, it was incorporated in New York, then Canada. Then, in 2018, it was incorporated in Estonia. Their team is small and clearly stretched thin. Also, two foreign company registrations were filed before the Canadian one, where the team is supposedly based.

In Estonia, the company was incorporated with 2,500 Euros capital, but no contribution has yet been made. Both incorporations in Estonia and the USA also means that some company records are behind paywalls, but looking at free information, it doesn’t look like Virtual Rehab has done much trading.

Funds remain unsupervised with no mention of third parties monitoring or ensuring funds are correctly distributed. This ICO has not set up any form of exit scam proofing and prospective ICO investments will be left at the team’s disposal.

As well as this, the company’s distribution of funds is vague. 50% of funds are going towards “future development”, 30% towards “marketing”, and the rest towards “partnerships. Their whitepaper doesn’t mention what they mean by any of these terms, and “future development” could be taken to mean anything.

Virtual Rehab’s product has not been applied to home or personal use. Most quarters of their roadmap state they are working on “product development”. Apparently, the product will be ready after the ICO is complete, which is a cause for concern.

As well as this, there are inconsistencies on their website, showing that they’re overhyping their project. For example, the Digital Trends links about media coverage link to two identical articles, only one is Spanish and one is American. Some of these links are even broken.

Furthermore, all of the links lead to information about how Virtual Rehab wishes to rehabilitate prisoners. There is nothing about addiction, pain management, or home use. There are no articles about Virtual Rehab’s ICO or project development. These articles don’t fit into Virtual Rehab’s supposed, larger business goals.

Their whitepaper generally doesn’t load on most browsers, and when it does there is little mention of prisoners, also. Their business plans are stretched and confused.

Their partners are left vague. The roadmap simply cites them as “in the Middle East”, there’s no telling of how helpful they may or may not be. Looking at how stretched the team is, however, it can be assumed that even good partners wouldn’t be able to prop up the company.

Their roadmap doesn’t surpass 2019. It doesn’t look like there’s much planning in place as to what funds will be actually used for, especially shown by the vague distribution graphs on the website and in the whitepaper.

Virtual Rehab plans to implement a worldwide, innovative and revolutionary VR system. Their figures don’t align with these plans.

With a soft cap of 5m and a hard cap of 20m, there’s no way of using any funds raised in their ICO to further their plans, especially as their funding distribution inspires no confidence.

With 60% of the tokens on sale to the public, also, and the rest being kept for their team, marketing, and partnership purposes, it’s clear that their token economy is mishandled.

A minimum investment of 100USD is required, too, meaning that the token’s value is disproportionate to the amount that will be bought. This is concerning, as if only the low cap was reached, only 30,000 people would have access to the tokens if everyone paid the minimum investment.

Also, Virtual Rehab hasn’t confirmed what they will do should this soft cap not be reached. There is no clause written into this project that details the potential returns of investors’ funds, which stands as a clear red flag.

With one more advisor than there are team members, running this company seems to be logistically impossible.

This is also because their company is spread worldwide, meaning communication is likely sparse and difficult.

Also, most of the team don’t mention Virtual Rehab, meaning a lot is likely outsourced.

Team:

https://www.linkedin.com/in/rajiwahidy/

Experience as a board member or businessman, but no experience in medicine or Virtual Reality, let alone ICOs or Blockchain. There is also overlap between his time as a board member elsewhere and the incorporation and running of Virtual Rehab.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/amal-azzeh-02439b168/

Has the same experience, or lack thereof, as the CEO. Working at the same company as him until before the incorporation of Virtual Rehab.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/brad-martin-6812a25a/

No mention of Virtual Rehab. Owner of another company.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/pjainsjc/

No mention of Virtual Rehab. Software Engineer in San Francisco.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/jbenizri/

No mention of Virtual Rehab. President at a different company.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/speville/

He also works at another company. The other company is eSports and therefore not related to medicine or blockchain.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/binodnirvan/

Works at ten companies, across the globe, and is the founder of one of them.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/mohamed-idlbi-pmp-9770a447/

Works at another company and is experienced in electrical engineering, not blockchain or VR.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/subramanian1/

Works at five companies and lives in India.

Advisors:

https://www.linkedin.com/in/donaldicox/

Works at four companies.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/karenghurst/

Works at four companies.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/bobbie-ticknor-31ba229/

Works as a Professor elsewhere.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/larrywray/

Works at seven different companies in a variety of different countries.

Works at thirteen companies.

https://www.linkedin.com/in/saeed-al-dhaheri-71a09058/

Works at four companies. Based in Dubai.

Virtual Rehab’s team may have accolades and experience in rehabilitation and therapy, but they have no experience in either ICOs or Virtual Reality as a whole.

Their idea may be a good one, but their execution is flawed, with a weak hard cap and minimal planning. As well as this, the vague fund distribution shows that this ICO will most likely fail in its goals.

They are globally stretched thin and don’t mention specific partnerships, only partnerships in a variety of areas. There is no clarity on whether or not these partnerships will help the company.

ICA Class Action is committed to warning investors against ICOs which have no third party safeguarding the allocation of the funds derived from ICOs, no ICO Funds Supervision Scheme deployed.